



Simon Ede
Experience of the EU ETS, CCRE, April 2017



Timeline of EU ETS

2005 - 2007
[CATEGORY NAME]

- Cost-free allocation of EUAs based on grandfathering
- Electricity generation and energy-intensive industries
- 40 EUR/t CO₂ penalty
- Oversupply of allowances
- EUA price drops to zero

2008 - 2012
[CATEGORY NAME]

- Total allowances reduced by 6.5%
- 10% of allowances auctioned
- 100 EUR/t CO₂ penalty
- Financial crisis depresses emissions and EUA demand
- Surplus of EUAs; price falls from 30 Euro to less than 7 Euro

- EU ETS Directive revised
- EU-wide emissions cap (reduced by 1.74% each year)
- Progressive shift from grandfathering to auctioning of allowances at national level
- Large surplus of EUAs transferred from 2nd to 3rd trading period; leads to EUA price of only 3-7 Euro
- Auctioning of 900 million EUAs postponed to end of the trading period (“backloading”)
- European Commission proposes a market stability reserve for next trading period

2013 - 2020
[CATEGORY NAME]


Jul 2015
EC PROPOSAL TO REVISE EU ETS

2021 - 2030
[CATEGORY NAME]

Oct 2003
[CATEGORY NAME]




Emissions have fallen, primarily in the power sector




Source: European Environment Agency. Data excluding aviation sector which joined in 2012, data excludes effect of changes in scope of emissions and allowances

EUA prices have fallen to low levels and the credibility of the ETS is frequently challenged



Sources: Point Carbon, 2012; EEA, 2016a; EEA/EU ETS Data viewer, 2016; EEX, 2016; ICE, 2016.

The market has responded to policy design error and external shocks to the system




Sources: Point Carbon, 2012; EEA, 2016a; EEA/EU ETS Data viewer, 2016; EEX, 2016; ICE, 2016.
 Note these numbers include an adjustment for changes in scope for allowances and emissions

Estimated multi-billion euro windfall profits accrued to EUA holders

- Windfall profits emerged from
 - over-allocation of free EUAs.
 - passing through the opportunity costs of freely obtained allowances.
 - using cheap CDM/JI credits for compliance and re-selling freely obtained EUAs.
- The initial phase of EU ETS incorporated an unrealistic premise that the opportunity cost of EUAs would not be passed – even if EUAs were granted for free
- Policy-makers also failed to understand the possibility of arbitrage
 - Financialisation brings profit motive to emissions reductions

Emissions reductions driven by renewables policy rather than ETS create considerable distortions


Change in Emissions 2005 - 2015



Note: 200 MT CO₂e is An approximate calculation based on TWh increase in wind and solar renewable generation as substitute for average thermal generation in EU.

Low EUA and coal prices drives increase in coal generation – counter to ex-ante expectations

Coal's share of thermal power generation, 2008 – 2015



Responses and Lessons

Responses

- Expansion of EUA Auctions
- Restrictions on CERs
- Backloading
- Market Stability Reserve
- Single EU cap not national targets
- Intervention in carbon price (e.g., UK carbon price floor)

Lessons

- Scarcity is fundamental
- External shocks need to be dynamically addressed – need to avoid entitlement culture
- Either pick a market approach or pick a tax and subsidy pathway but mixing is hard
- Seams issues